The Danger of Hamas's Tahidiya Proposal

Confronting the problem of terrorism at present in the Gaza strip necessitates a 'Defensive Shield' like operation, entailing national mobilization, and wide international support.

A close examination of Hamas's strategy reveals that its proposed plan contains nothing new, neither in substance nor in its time framework. Hamas merely seeks a period of time allowing it to improve its rocket structure and restore its terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank seriously hampered by the Israeli Security Agency's counter terrorist measures. Entering this honey trap will in all probability turn out in the long run to be a strategic mistake on part of Israel, as witnessed by all in Lebanon, vis-à-vis Hizballah, in the summer of 2006.
The Hamas movement is attempting to revive its proposal of a Tahidiya (temporary cease fire) with Israel. The deputy of Khalid Mashaal in the Hamas leadership, Musa abu Marzuk, said in an interview with the Egyptian daily al-Aharam (June 2, 2007), that Hamas is initiating a new stage regarding a Tahidiya with Israel, and it is now willing to accept a Tahidiya, "limited by time and reciprocal " in the West Bank and Gaza strip. Abu Marzuk noted that the Tahidiya can last a year, and all sides – Israel and the Palestinian organizations – must be committed to it.
On the face of it, this position is an expression of diplomatic flexibility on part of Hamas, and a willingness to talk and reach an agreement with Israel, enabling coexistence in the shadow of a cease fire. A meticulous examination however, of the Hamas proposal reveals that there is nothing new about this proposal, neither in substance nor in its time framework. For Hamas, the meaning of a Tahidiya is merely tactical, representing no strategic shift, intimating a possible coming to terms with the existence of the state of Israel within the Arab world as an independent Jewish state. Tahidiya in essence, is a lower step than Hudna, but whose meaning is identical. Both have the same goal: improving the preparedness of the Muslim believers toward renewal of the military campaign to defeat the enemy.
The most important clause in abu Marzuk's interview refers to the importance of Israel's commitment to comply with the terms of the Tahidiya in accordance with Hamas's interpretation. This interpretation is all encompassing and comprises a cessation of Israeli military activity in the West Bank and Gaza strip, including entry into Palestinian Authority areas, targeting terrorists, arresting terrorism suspects, dismantling terrorist infrastructures, etc. in other words, abu Marzuk's proposal sells Israel 'false quiet' for a short duration, in exchange for an Israeli abandonment of its struggle against terrorism. Moreover, it entails an Israeli acceptance of freedom of activity of the terrorist organizations, and allowing them to expand their operative infrastructure in advance of the renewal of the terrorist and rocket attack against it under improved conditions.
Entering this Hamas honey trap may very well turn out to be a long term Israeli strategic blunder, as the lessons of the war against Hizballah in Lebanon in summer 2006 proved. Hamas, after failing to drag Israel into the Gazan quagmire and thus bring about the collapse of the Palestinian Authority, now seeks a period of time that would enable it to restore its ability to strike at the heart of Israeli residential areas, by improving its rocket technology, and restoring its terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank, that have been seriously damaged by Israeli security counter measures. Hamas also hopes that an advance in Iran's nuclear project in the coming year will bear on Israel's considerations, particularly when facing the option of a comprehensive military operation in the Gaza strip.
Israel, for its part, has limited options. Closing its eyes can only increase the military challenge. Confronting the problem of terrorism at present in the Gaza strip necessitates a 'Defensive Shield' like operation, entailing national mobilization, and wide international support. Beyond the military aspect, there is need to draw an elaborate diplomatic plan, in order to establish a stable Palestinian regime (even if it lacks wide support), capable of enforcing law and order. The U.S. experience in Iraq demonstrates the paramount importance of diplomatic planning in advance of any military initiative.

Thwarting the Hope to Destroy Israel

Khaled Masha'al's deputy, Musa abu Marzuk, communicated his historic outlook in a recent interview. Among other things, the weakness of Israel's leadership, the success of the 'resistance', the hope to destroy Israel, and not despair, as the moving force of the struggle. The challenge facing Israel: thwarting the hope to destroy it.

Khaled masha'al's deputy in the Hamas leadership, Musa abu Marzuk, opened a window onto understanding Hamas's conception of the struggle with Israel in a recent interview on the organization's website (May 20, 2007). Abu Marzuk acknowledges the civil war within the Palestinian Authority and the military conflict with Israel, but chooses to base his view of the Palestinian Israeli conflict on an historic perspective, regarding the accomplishments achieved so far, and particularly the goals Hamas strives to realize within the present generation. Here are the central tenets of abu Marzuk's outlook:

The liberation of Palestine and restoration of the 'robbed' national rights have in recent years become closer to realization for several reasons:

The collapse of all diplomatic initiatives to resolve the conflict and resettle the refugees.

In the coming years there will be a Palestinian majority within historic Palestine.

The Palestinian problem has been transformed from a humanitarian problem to a problem of a nation, rights and state.

The path of resistance has taken precedence over the diplomatic path among all Palestinian factions. The resistance will continue to dismantle the Zionist enterprise, enabling the Palestinian people to restore their 'robbed' rights.

A new generation of leaders has emerged in Israel, not committed as in the past to the Zionist enterprise for reasons related to the Zionist enterprise itself, and others related to developments of the conflict and the region.

The Israeli military that defeated the Arab armies in the past has repeatedly failed to contend with an armed popular force, armed with the spirit of resilience and determination to win (Intifada, withdrawal from Lebanon, pullout from the Gaza strip).

The U.S. is suffering from an increasing crisis enabling a shift in the balance of power on the world stage, resulting in diminishing level of international support for Israel.

Abu Marzuk stresses that the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip, and the previous pullout from Lebanon did not come about through negotiations, and logically and historically, complete victory over Israel will be achieved in this manner. Abu Marzuk clarifies that the right of return of the Palestinian refugees is a personal and collective right, and no one can renounce it, regionally or internationally. He goes on to state that there can be no solution to the Palestinian problem without the return of the refugees to their homes, and paying reparations for all the years they were outside Palestine.

The current round of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is merely one more stage in the overall struggle between the Zionist movement and the Palestinian national-religious movement, headed today by Hamas, the dominant force in the Palestinian arena. Unlike the image created by the media, the Palestinian determination to maintain the struggle against Israel is not a result of despair, oppression, and suffering on part of the Palestinian people, the majority of whom still live in crowded refugee camps. The armed struggle is motivated by the sense that has taken root since the 1990's that the possibility of defeating Israel is a dream that can cone true in this generation. Hope and not despair are thus the motivating force.

This is the reason the Palestinian leadership prefers to maintain the Palestinian refugee camps as a means to channel the energy of human suffering into mobilization to the armed struggle, as the hope of liberating Palestine and returning to their original homes is a thing of the near future. The Hamas movement holds the stick from both sides, asserting that the right of return is both a personal and collective right, i.e. Hamas expropriates the right of return and uses terror to prevent the refugees from choosing any other option (resettlement outside Palestine, reparations) other than returning to Palestine.

Thwarting this hope is the main challenge facing the state of Israel, and the key to restoring security and stability. To obtain this goal Israel needs a strong army, and no less important, steadfastness and belief in the just cause, as well as the willingness to make sacrifices for Jewish independence. The resolution of the Palestinian problem is not a Rubik cube, where logic, creativity, and trial and error will facilitate the solution. In a zero sum game, where in the Palestinian viewpoint both sides are competing for everything at any price, one requires spiritual strength, alongside lofty fighting morals, enabling unity in the service of the common goal. Any expression of ideological weakness or hesitation is construed by the Palestinian side as part of the crumbling of the Zionist enterprise, and an opportunity to step up the pressure of terrorism against Israeli society.

Where is the Crisis in the Gaza Strip Leading?

The management of the current crisis by Hamas and the Palestinian terrorist organizations is different from past instances. The massive bombardment of Sderot and the Negev communities is intended to cause provocation whose disregard will result in serious erosion of Israel's deterrence, and a breakdown of confidence between the Israeli public and its government, which is unable to provide adequate security. Unlike past cases, it appears that the Hamas leadership has not set an exit point for the current crisis, and its policy is designed to drag Israel into ground military activity within the Gaza strip.

Present Hamas policy is dictated by radical elements within the movement, seeking to challenge the current leadership and bring about the collapse of the national unity government. This wing is lead by former foreign minister, Mahmoud al-Zahar, and former interior minister Said Siam, who do not conceal their militant posture vis-à-vis Israel and the Fatah. This wing has been joined by Nizar Riyan, former commander of the al-Qassam Brigades in the northern Gaza strip, and Ahmad Ja'abari, a senior commander of the al-Qassam Brigades, who no longer heeds the directives of the Hamas political echelon.

The continued bombardment of the Negev communities and the renewal of targeted killings by Israel could very well indicate the escalation of the present round of the conflict. The overt directive by Hamas leadership to the al-Qassam Brigades to renew suicide bombings inside Israel will increase pressure on the Israeli government to step up its military retaliation, and will enjoy broad support for such a move by the Israeli public.

While the Palestinians have reached yet another cease fire agreement between their rival factions, this does not signal the end of the conflict between Fatah and Hamas. The Hamas leadership seeks to deal Fatah a defeat, and in its view, any cease fire is merely a 'hudna' – a regrouping before the next stage of the conflict. In the situation whereby Hamas is unable to attain full control of the Palestinian Authority, and receive the PLO on a silver platter on its own terms, its preferable option is to foment political chaos, in order to bring about the collapse of the existing systems controlled by Fatah, eliminate the Fatah leadership, and seize key positions by force. From Hamas's point of view, a move resulting in the collapse of the Palestinian Authority, can serve its strategic interests to establish Islamic rule in the Gaza strip.

The Modes of Operation Facing Israel are as Follows:

Continued restraint (while striking terrorists), hoping that Arab pressure and the balance of fear between Fatah and Hamas will lead to relative calm (until the next outbreak of violence).

Limited ground activity in the northern Gaza strip, aimed at creating a buffer zone and distancing the rocket launchers. The practical outcome of such measures is limited, as the significant terrorist infrastructure is not located in the rocket launching areas. Engagement with the terrorists within a built up area can afford the terrorist organizations relative advantages, and the continued fighting with its attendant casualties, can bring about the end of the campaign without meaningful achievements.

The occupation of the Gaza strip. A wide scale military campaign lacks a consensus as of now, one reason being the realization of the complete failure of the unilateral disengagement strategy. Only such a military operation can stamp down Palestinian terrorism, similar to the IDF and security services successes in the West Bank. Such a move is not easy at all militarily, as would be the daily rule of the Palestinian population. The key element of any Israeli plan must be the 'day after', i.e. how to reinstall a strong Palestinian government capable of enforcing law and order.

Independence under Qasam Rockets

Israel celebrates Independence Day under customary Qasam rocket barrage. Hamas spokesman: "shelling of Israel will continue, because the Zionist enemy does not understand anything other than force". Hamas military threat increasing.

Israel's 59th Independence Day began with the customary firework display and continued with the customary daily volley of Qasam rockets toward southern Israel. Dozens of Qasam rockets, including long range rockets and mortar shells, were launched on Independence Day morning (April 24, 2007) toward Ashkelon and the towns ringing the Gaza strip. Hamas was quick to admit responsibility for this shelling, claiming in an official announcement that their military wing launched at least thirty rockets and six mortar shells. The immediate cause: "retaliation for Israel's crimes in the West Bank".

A spokesman for the al-Qasam brigades told the organization's official website that the shelling of Israeli towns and villages will continue, because "the Zionist enemy does not understand anything other than force", as well as the attempts to kidnap additional Israeli soldiers. According to him, the al-Aqsa brigades are set to block any Israeli operation in the Gaza strip which "will become a graveyard for the Israeli army".

Analysis of the significance of the Hamas assault on Independence Day should not be undertaken out of the context of the security situation emerging in the Gaza strip. Actually, it is merely one link in the war the Palestinians have been waging against Israel during the Intifada which continues even after Israel withdrew unilaterally from the Gaza strip, hoping that ' lessening friction' with the Palestinians will weaken their resolve to continue their terrorist attacks, and create a foundation for diplomatic negotiations. The main meanings are as follows:

The erosion of Israeli deterrence – Hamas fears not to initiate a large scale attack on Israel - a move Israel would otherwise consider a cause for all out war on every other front - assuming that Israel has no real military option against it, and its response, at most, will be a limited military operation. Hamas views Israel as strategically weakened (resulting from the war in Lebanon, and the leadership crisis), and being exceedingly difficult to mobilize Israeli society to an all out campaign in the Gaza strip, which would most likely exact a heavy price in human lives, and reinstall Israeli military rule in the Gaza strip.

Dictating the rules of the game – sensing Israel's strategic weakness, and despite the fundamental asymmetry between both forces, Hamas is attempting to dictate the rules of the game, as if it were the dominant side of the equation. It is creating a linkage between the West Bank and the Gaza strip, and reserves the right to respond militarily to any Israeli activity in the West Bank they view as harming Palestinians. The Independence Day attack sends a clear message – the Palestinians will exact a heavy price from Israel if it fails to maintain the ceasefire on Hamas terms, including in the West Bank, meaning the cessation of Israel's counter measures against terrorism.

The loss of Israeli initiative – following Israel's unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza strip, it has shifted to a policy based on 'absorbing', whose boundaries are ever expanding, and determined solely according to the balance of blood; i.e. Israel does not consider the daily barrages of rockets on its towns as a cause to launch a military response. Only Palestinian 'success' –Israelis killed, an abducted Israeli soldier, or serious damage to a strategic installation, are deemed deserving of a military retaliation. Accordingly, the Israeli towns and villages and military camps have become easy practice targets for the Palestinian terrorist organizations.

The deepening credibility crisis between the pubic and its government – the restraint and lack of resolve on part of the Israeli government, is interpreted by the residents of southern Israel as their abandonment to Palestinian fire due to political considerations. This message is relevant to all Israelis, as the concord between the state and its populace is breached, and they can no longer trust the state to come to their help in times of danger.

The Gaza 'time machine' – a serious threat to Israel's security is developing in the Gaza strip. Iranian military involvement and military assistance to Hamas, are preparing the infrastructure for a southern military threat on the Israeli rear, and making it a permanent hostage. This can be taken as an illustration of the situation that would emerge in the West Bank if Israel were to implement Prime Minister Olmert's plan to disengage from large portions of the West Bank and hand them over to the Palestinian Authority.

The Gaza Strip Time Machine

We have to go no further than look at the "time machine' of the Gaza strip in order to understand the real dangers to the security of the state of Israel.

The pessimists were optimistic. The Israeli ministry of transport, acting upon IDF decrees, ordered earlier this week the farmers living in the villages ringing the Gaza strip, to cease flying their crop-dusting aircraft over the area of the Sha'ar Hanegev regional council. This order came into effect, due to concerns that Palestinians would try to shoot down these light aircraft with shoulder missile launchers, smuggled into the Gaza strip. The prohibition to fly came into effect forthwith, but was abrogated after twenty four hours. The terrorist attacks from the Gaza strip continue daily, and include Qasam rockets, small arm fire, and anti tank fire toward civilian and military targets. On March 19, 2007, an employee of the Israeli electricity board was wounded after being hit by heavy machine gunfire from within the Gaza strip.

Opponents of the unilateral withdrawal, both on the left and right of the political spectrum, forewarned of its security implications. They rejected the basic tenets of the withdrawal plan and its ramifications, as worded in the 'Kadima' party platform, appearing to this day on the party's official website: "the disengagement created a new window of opportunity enabling real progress, including a breakthrough in attempts to reach a peace solution and begin shaping the final status borders of the state of Israel. The disengagement conveyed a message that Israel has all the intentions to achieve peace, even at the price of painful concessions, and has shifted responsibility for the next stage to the Palestinians. There is national, regional, and international consensus that the 'road map' is the sole diplomatic plan enabling true progress on the path to a comprehensive and long lasting peace treaty.

The window of opportunity has not materialized, and the chance of a peace treaty is non-existent. The only advantage of the disengagement is that it turned the Gaza strip into a virtual 'time machine' allowing us to peek into the future. A summary of terrorist activity in 2006, presented recently by the head of the Israel Security Agency (Shabak), depicts a most grave picture. The extent of Palestinian terrorism from within the Gaza strip continues to climb following the disengagement, together with the arming of the terrorist organizations with advanced weapons, including anti-aircraft missiles, large scale mobilization and preparing the forces for the next stage of the conflict with Israel.

There is no need for sophisticated intelligence evaluations or confidential information to foretell the most feasible scenario after a possible withdrawal from the West Bank. The formula is clear: Palestinian terrorist patterns multiplied many times over. Israel's international airport will be shut down repeatedly due to fears of anti-aircraft fire toward airplanes, towns and villages close to the border, including Tel Aviv, will come under daily more advanced Qasam rocket fire, and the main transportation arteries will be closed to civilian traffic because of gunfire from within the Palestinian Authority territory.

These days are crucial for shaping the 'rules of the game' with the Palestinian Authority. Continued restraint in the face of daily Palestinian terrorist attacks is not an expression of strength or of diplomatic sophistication. It is perceived by the Palestinian side as leadership helplessness, a weakness of Israeli society, and gradual collapse of the Zionist ideology. Israeli commentators and politicians expressed this week support for talking with Hamas, finding common cause between the Hamas notion of a 'Hudna', and the concept of an interim agreement coveted by the Israeli government. We have to go no further than look at the "time machine' of the Gaza strip in order to understand the real dangers to the security of the state of Israel, if Israel continues to sell strategic assets in exchange for monopoly bank notes the Palestinians are willing to print so generously in payment of any agreement.

Hamas Army Undermines Palestinian Authority

Hamas new army is fortifying its straining to establish a 'state within a state', and complete its 'white revolution', thus paving the way for the election of Khalid Mashaal as the next president of Palestine.

The Hamas movement is conducting negotiations for the exchange of prisoners with Israel from a position of strength, attesting to the shift it senses has occurred in the balance of power since Israel's unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza strip. Hamas spokesmen continue to present Israel with the ultimate demand to release all 'heavy' Palestinian prisoners, among them dispatchers of suicide bombers. The list, from their point of view, is final, and if Israel fails to acquiesce to the demands of the kidnappers (they themselves), Hamas leaders warn of the resumption of suicide bombings and additional abductions to cause Israel to modify its position.

Hamas: Israel has no real military options

The main reason for Hamas's strategic shift and its boldness to demand such a heavy price for the release of Gilad Shalit, derives, first and foremost, from the assumption that Israel has no real military options against the Palestinian Authority. Reports of preparations for a large scale operation in the Gaza strip are viewed by Hamas as nothing more than Israeli psychological warfare, and not an actual option.

The Hamas movement has become the ruling party and is mobilizing the economic resources and infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority to transform the terrorist wing of the movement – the Iz a-Din al-Qasam brigades –into a regular army, which in due time will become the Palestinian national army, following their takeover of the Palestinian Authority and PLO institutes.

15,000 Hamas Mujahidoon

The Hamas Jihad army is rapidly materializing. Interviews with senior armed wing leaders in the Palestinian media divulge the foundations of a regular army that could very well become a threat to the state of Israel and serve as a spearhead for solidifying Hamas rule. Senior military leaders of Hamas disclose that that the al-Qasam brigades have become the largest military force in the Gaza strip, comprising 15,000 combatants, and mobilization of new recruits is continuing apace. Dozens of training camps have been established since Israel's withdrawal, where new recruits are being trained by military experts (probably also foreign), some of whom have trained in Lebanon by Hizballah activists, and perhaps in Iran. The basic training includes physical fitness, shooting, rocket launching, crawling under barbed wire, scaling buildings, ant taking over houses.

The Hamas army soldiers are posted along the eastern and northern border with Israel, and their task is to follow Israeli army activity round the clock, and protect the territory of the Palestinian authority. Thus, the Hamas army is fulfilling a national mission under the responsibility of the Palestinian presidency.

Building regular army

The new organizational structure of the al-Qasam brigades follows that of a regular army. The 'Morabitoun' unit is the largest, divided into five brigades within the Gaza strip. Each brigade is sub-divided into battalions, companies and platoons. Each platoon comprises 11 combatants, specializing in specific warfare: anti tank, snipers, planting explosive charges, infantry men, and a commander.

The Hamas army is developing a logistics array, a manufacturing unit comprising several sub-divisions (rockets, bombs and explosive charges, armor, explosives), and a development and testing unit. They also have an observation unit, responsible for collecting visual intelligence, suicide bomber unit, and special operations unit. The communications and information divisions are subordinate to the military apparatus, and comprise announcement, statistics, graphics and movies, translation and language, publication and production units.
The Hamas munitions arsenal includes 2000 RPG rockets, imported from abroad; tens of thousands of 'Yasin' rockets (local RPG's); thousands of Qasam rockets, adequate to "engage the enemy" (according to Hamas leaders); and tens of thousands of various assault rifles.

'State within a state'

The establishment of the Hamas army, accomplished without hindrance thanks to the 'Philadelpi route' strategic artery, used to smuggle in weaponry, is methodically eroding Israel's deterrence, severely curtailed following the unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza strip and the war in Lebanon. This army is fortifying Hamas's straining to establish a 'state within a state', and complete its 'white revolution', thus paving the way for the election of Khalid Mashaal as the next president of Palestine.

Under the present circumstances, the Hamas army will be an impediment to any attempts to promote a diplomatic initiative between Israel and the Palestinian presidency, headed by Abu Mazen or the Arab league, while attempting (a priori impossible) to circumvent the Palestinians.

Palestinian Banks to Open Channel to Pay PA Salaries.


Source: Ayyam (PA), April 30, 2006
ٍA senior banking source said yesterday to Al-Ayyam the banks operating in the Palestinian territories including the Arab Bank agreed to transfer the salaries from the amounts of money, which were granted by the Arab countries and deposited in Arab League account in one of banks in Cairo, directly to the accounts of the PA's employees.
The source, who preferred to stay anonymous, noted that the discussions between the banks operating in the Palestinian territories and the Arab League are about to be concluded "and we expect that the salaries will be paid in the next following days".
He said: "we have informed the Arab League that we don't have any objection to receive the moneys with the personal name and bank account of the beneficiaries. These lists won't include any reference of the PA or the government and not even mention whether the beneficiaries are officials in the PA.
He added: "Every bank will receive its share of moneys which were deposited in the Arab League account in one of the Egyptian banks. We do not have any problem to work with such arrangement".
This arrangement will ease in late April the salaries crisis of more than 160,000 employees in the Palestinian Authority who have not received their salaries since last March.
The banking source said: "I think that the salaries, or at least part of it, will be transferred in the next two or three days".
The Arab League announced that it actually received 70 million USD from Arab countries in support of the PA's budget in accordance to the resolution accepted in the last Arab League convention in Sudan. The Arab League could not transfer the moneys because of the refusal of the banks to work with the PA under Hamas government fearing from sanctions which may be imposed by the American government.